Volume 117
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 117,
2012-2013
3-1-2013

Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning
Robert Whitman

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Robert Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 DICK. L. REV. 1061 (2013).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol117/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning
Robert Whitman*
Abstract
Clients consulting with elder and estate planning attorneys for estate
planning documents will likely receive a "package" of five documents: a
will, a trust (revocable or irrevocable), a health care power, a durable
power of attorney, and a living will. Although capacity standards have
varied for each of the items in the "package," an informal survey of
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) members
reveals that practitioners do not pay attention to these distinctions when
they create the "package." Practitioners are either unwilling to accept the
engagement for lack of competence or willing to overlook the capacity
distinctions when accepting the engagement. This article thus advocates
for a uniform test for capacity when an attorney considers preparing the
"package" for a client.
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INTRODUCTION

In lifetime and estate planning today, a client on consulting an
attorney-whether the attorney holds herself out as a general
practitioner,' elder lawyer,' or trusts and estates lawyer 3-often will
receive five planning documents at the same time. These documents
include a will, a trust (revocable or irrevocable), a health care power, a
durable power of attorney, and a living will.
For this article's purposes, these items will be termed the
"package."
Usually, the package includes all of the documents
mentioned above. The issue posed here is whether lawyers should apply
the same standards for mental capacity for all lifetime and estate
planning done at the same time. This article will proceed as follows: Part
I will provide an overview of the capacity questions. Part II will explore
historical roots for capacity standards and will evaluate modern trends
for the varying standards for judging capacity. Part III will review recent
cases dealing with varying standards for mental capacity, and Part IV

will advance a unitary test for capacity.
II.

VARYING STANDARDS FOR MENTAL CAPACITY

This Part surveys the varying standards for mental capacity.
Section A traces the historic development of the different standards for
judging mental capacity for lifetime and estate planning. Section B then
discusses specific standards of capacity for specific legal transactions,
such as capacity to make an inter vivos gift, capacity to convey real
property, and capacity for health care proxies. Finally, Section C

1. Any individual in good standing as an attorney in a state is qualified to conduct a
general practice in that state, including a practice of elder law or trusts and estates law.
2. Attorneys may refer to themselves as elder lawyers, or as trusts and estates
lawyers. While elder lawyers may carry out many of the tasks done by trusts and estates
lawyers, the elder lawyer is likely to also deal with matters that particularly affect the
elderly and disabled. Social security issues, transfer of assets, guardianships (also known
in some states as conservatorships), capacity, and working with a functional family group
are often some of the matters dealt with by elder lawyers.
3. Trusts and estates lawyers are more likely to draft complex instruments with
international, federal, and state tax issues in mind, prepare buy-sell agreements,
irrevocable life insurance trusts, grantor retained annuity trusts, generation skipping
trusts, and deal with complex estate and trust administrations, It is important to note that
there are no set boundaries. Rather, the attorney will deal with matters depending on her
experience and expertise.
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evaluates the actual judgments practicing lawyers make when deciding
whether to create the package for a client.
HistoricalStandardsfor Mental Capacity

A.

Historically, different standards developed for judging mental
capacity for various items in the package. At common law in England,
different courts (e.g., the law courts and the ecclesiastical courts) would
deal with various items of the package. Varying standards of capacity in
various situations came to the common law through Roman law.4
Capacity standards continue to be different depending on the transaction
involved.5 For instance, state law may require that, for making gifts, a
person must understand the property dispositions being made, the
persons and objects of his or her bounty, and the amount that the gift
would deplete the donor's assets.6 By contrast, for a valid durable power
of attorney, health care directive, or living will, a higher standard for
mental capacity has been required.7 For a will, the capacity standard
likely will be lower.8
Practitioners who prepare the package tend to overlook the varying
standards for capacity. In representing a client, many practitioners
disregard nuances in the tests, either drafting documents for the entire
package or withdrawing from the engagement. If the attorney finds the
client mentally capable for part of the items contained in the package, the
attorney will often find competency for all of the items. In other words,
from a practical point of view, the differences in capacity standards are
essentially overlooked9 when the documents are drafted. This result
occurs in spite of the fact that varying degrees of capacity remain in the
law and that they would be meaningful if documents for the package are
completed at different times or the issue is brought up in some later
litigation. °

4.

EUNICE L. Ross & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 2.4 (2d ed. 2012) (citing

HENRY SWINBURNE,

A BRIEF TREATISE

OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS

(Garland Publ'g

1978) (1590).
5. Id.
6.
7.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B

8. See infra Part II.B.
9. E-mails from members of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
(ACTEC) to Robert Whitman, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School
(Dec. 2012) (on file with author). An informal survey of several members of the ACTEC
reveals little concern for the variations in capacity standards when all the documents for
the package are being prepared at the same time.
10. In litigation, the rules concerning who has the burden of proof may have a
substantial effect on the ability to prove capacity or incapacity. Commonly, experts for
each side will clash over the capacity question.

1064

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:4

A partial explanation for this oversight is the fact that the
counseling-drafting lawyer realizes that she is not the ultimate decider.
Rather, if the documents are later challenged in court, it will be the judge
or the jury that will decide the issue. Thus, in a close case, the lawyer
may feel that she owes her client the chance to demonstrate intent, even
if, at a later stage, the trier of fact rejects the document." Another
explanation may be that the counseling-drafting lawyer may not feel
qualified to make a decision on capacity. 12 For information on dementia
and other specific capacity issues, see the Appendix.
B.

Standardsof Capacityfor Specific Legal Transactions

At common law, different standards for judging mental capacity
developed for specific legal transactions.
1.

Testimony Capacity

By Anglo-American legal tradition, those who wish to make a will
must possess "sound mind."' 13 This prerequisite was developed not from
the English common law, but from Roman canon law.' 4 Medieval
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over probate matters and followed
Justinian's Institutes.15 Under Roman law, a testator could not make a
valid will unless he or she was experiencing a moment of lucidity:
"[T]hose in the power of others are so absolutely incapable that they
cannot make a testament even with the permission of their parents.16
Medieval canonists were also concerned that testators not of sound
mind were subject to undue influence and duress;' 7 therefore, if the
testator was not of sound mind, the will could not be considered to be a
valid statement of her last wishes.

11.

See generally Robert Whitman, Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence,

108 TR. & EsT. 567 (1969).
12. While the American Bar Association stresses the advantages of consulting with a
psychologist or psychiatrist at the drafting stage, often the client will reject this
suggestion. See AM. BAR ASS'N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 31-34 (2005),
available at http://bit.ly/cBslZm. It is rare for a lawyer to be trained as a psychologist or
psychiatrist. Nonetheless, a lawyer may be called upon to make a judgment on mental
capacity. However, as stated above, a suggested referral to a medical professional may
be against the client's wishes.
13. Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, 'Sufficient' Capacity: The Contrasting
Capacity Requirementsfor Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 307 (2006).
14. Ross & REED, supra note 4, § 2.4.
15. Id.
16. J. INST. 2.12.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford Press 4th ed. 1906).
17. Ross & REED, supra note 4, § 2.4.
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In a 1590 treatise, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills,
Henry Swinburne argued that probate courts should presume that the
testator was of sound mind.' 8 He shifted the burden to those contesting
the will to prove that the testator had not been capable at the time of the
making of the will.' 9 Swinbume was especially concerned with the
testator making his will on his deathbed.2 0 He described three possible
scenarios:
(a) the kind made by a man having a good understanding and sound
memory who utters his own will, although he may have difficulty in
speaking; (b) the man whose degree of understanding and memory is
impaired to some extent, whose will may be proved if he is able to
speak distinctly enough to be understood; and (c) the man who is
hardly able to speak, who is interrogated by some other person
z who
tries to record his answers to leading questions about his will. 2
Swinburne believed that, on their deathbeds, property holders might
be bullied or persuaded to make wills that were more the reflection of the
bullies' wishes than their own. Wills such as these, he stated, should be
voided by the courts.2 2
England's common law courts then developed a test to determine
23
the testator's mental capacities at the time of the making of the will.
The test was developed in the 1790 case Greenwoodv. Greenwoo- 4 and
the 1840 case Harwood v. Baker.2 5 In Greenwood, a young man dying
from tuberculosis made a will in favor of his cousin. His brother
contested the will, arguing that, when he made the will, the testator was
insane. A nurse testified that Greenwood did indeed have moments of
insanity, to such an extent that he had to be confined in a straightjacket.
In his instructions to the jury, 6 the judge described a test the jury should
use in determining the testator's mental capacity:
[T]he single inquiry in this case is: whether he was of sound and
disposing mind and memory at the time when he made his will....
If he had a power of summoning up his mind so as to know what his
18.

See Ross &

REED,

supra note 4, § 2.4 (citing HENRY

TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS

SWINBURNE,

(Garland Publ'g 1978) (1590).

A BRIEF
Henry

Swinbume (1551-1624) was an ecclesiastical lawyer and scholar.
19. See Ross & REED, supra note 4, § 2.4.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Greenwood v. Greenwood, (1790) 163 Eng. Rep. 930 (K.B.).
25. Harwood v. Baker, (1840) 13 Eng. Rep. 117 (P.C.).
26. Probate litigation can be held before a trial judge or a jury. Many experienced
litigators would prefer a jury, feeling that their developed skills can help them to sway the
jury to their cause.
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property was, and who those persons were that were
the objects of his
27
will.
his
make
to
competent
was
he
then
bounty,

In Harwoodv. Baker, a wealthy businessman made a deathbed will
leaving all his property to his second wife.2 s His children pointed out
that he had suffered a stroke and probably had little understanding of the
ramifications of his actions. 29 His attending physicians confirmed that
their patient lapsed in and out of consciousness.3 ° The servants'
testimony seemed to have as much to do with their opinion of Mrs. Baker
as with the facts of the case.3 x Mr. Baker's friend testified that the
32
testator had intended to leave the bulk of his property to his family.
The court, not surprisingly, affirmed the lower court's overturning of the
will, stating:
[T]heir Lordships are of opinion, that in order to constitute a sound
disposing mind, a testator must not only be able to understand that he
is by his will giving the whole of his property to one object of his
regard; but that he must also have capacity to comprehend the extent
of his property, and the nature of the claims of others, whom by his
Will, he is excluding from all participation in that property; and that
the protection of the law is in no cases more needed then it is in those
cases where the mind has been too much enfeebled to comprehend
more objects than one, and most especially when that one object may
be so forced upon the attention of
33the invalid, as to shut out all others
that might require consideration.
Mrs. Baker had been in constant attention at her husband's bedside, and
husband's concern had been thus diverted from
the court feared that her
34
the rest of his family.
The Greenwood-Baker test that developed from these cases has
three factors. The testator is considered of sound mind if, at the time he
makes his will, (1) he knows "the natural objects of his bounty," (2) the
extent of his property, and (3) the disposition he is making of this
property. Nevertheless, a testator's capacity is most likely to be
questioned if he leaves his property to someone other than "the natural
objects of his bounty," particularly if the recipient is unusual or
controversial.

27. Ross & REED, supra note 4, § 2.6.
28. See Harwood, 13 Eng. Rep. at 118.
29. See id. at 118-19.
30. See id. at 118-20.
31. See id. at 121.
32. See id.
33. Harwood, 13 Eng. Rep. at 120.
34.

See id.

20131
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Historically, heirs have had a better chance of overturning wills
made in favor of much-younger partners or partners found later in life,35
gay partners,36 or the testator's dogs.37 As Swinburne warned, departures

from the familial norm raise red flats, and beneficiaries are accused of
undue influence and duress.38 Relatives might not be able to accuse the
dogs of undue influence, but they frequently do accuse the muchyounger partners or a non-family beneficiary who arrives on the scene
shortly before the testator's death.39
Mental Capacity to Make an Inter Vivos Gift

2.

The Restatement (Third) of Property'smental capacity requirements
for making an inter vivos gift might be described as "Greenwood-Baker
Plus. ' 4° At common law, the donor must have the capacity required to
make a will, as well as an understanding of the economic ramifications
of the gift: "the effect that the gift may have on the future financial
security of the donor and of anyone who may be dependent on the
donor. ' Court decisions on the validity of inter vivos gifts tend to be
very fact-specific. Judges and/or juries look closely at the events
surrounding the gift to determine the following question: Did a donor's
behavior show evidence that she was no longer capable of controlling her
financial affairs without assistance, or that she was giving away all of42her
property, or that she did not understand the consequences of her gift?
Parties contesting the validity of an inter vivos gift on mental
capacity grounds typically claim that the donor was subjected to undue
influence by the donee.4 3 They argue that, under this influence, the

35. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burkland, 504 P.2d 1143 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972), review
denied, 82 Wash. 2d 1002 (1973).
36. See, e.g., In re Kaufmann's Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964),
aff'd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965); Jeffrey M. Alden, Note, Testamentary Capacity in a
Nutshell: A PsychiatricRevolution, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 112642 (1966).
37. Pressure from animal lovers has caused the Uniform Trust Code to provide a
trust provision for a testator's pets. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 (amended 2005).
38. See Ross & REED, supra note 4, § 2.4.
39. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
40.

See

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF PROPERTY:

WILLS

AND

OTHER

DONATIVE

TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003). Greenwood-Baker Plus: testamentary capacity along with the
donor's understanding of the financial impact of his or her gift.
41. Id. § 8.1(c) (2003).
42. Id. If, for instance, the donor gave away all her property before having an
operation, the question would be has the donor thought about how she would live if she
survives?
43. See ROGER W. ANDERSON & IRA M. BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 99 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the relevant factors to be considered in determining
the presence or absence of undue influence).
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incapacitated donor was unable to look after his own welfare, and
perhaps, more importantly, those of his rightful heirs.
In the 2011 case Goodman v. Atwood,4 an elderly lady's guardian
contested her gift of a large sum of money to her veterinarian. 45 At trial,
the judge applied the lesser standard of testamentary capacity. 46 He also
placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that the donor did not
have the required mental capacity.47 The appellate court denied that the
donor lacked sufficient capacity: "The plaintiffs own witness conceded
the possibility that the donor experienced periods of mental awareness in
addition to her lucidity regarding financial affairs. 48 As for the burden of
proof, the defendant was not in a position of fiduciary responsibility
to
49
the donor; therefore, the burden remained with the plaintiff.
Similarly, in Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue,' ° a plaintiff
attempted to contest her brother's gift of an apple farm to a land
conservation trust. 51 The donor wanted to ensure that the land would not
be developed, and he executed a deed of gift to Landmark Trust. 52 A few
months later, the donor began to show signs of deteriorating mental
capacity, and he was placed under involuntary guardianship.53 The
guardian and the sister contested the gift of the farm, claiming that the54
donor was mentally incapacitated at the time of the gift's execution.
They lost at trial, and they appealed, claiming that the judge had applied
the wrong test for mental capacity.5 5 The defendants' first claim was that
the "court erred in applying the standard for testamentary capacity to the
inter vivos transfers. Defendants claim[ed] the tests are different and that
competence to enter a highly complex inter vivos transaction
should be
56
will.
a
execute
to
necessary
competence
the
from
different
The appellate court, however, stated that the Vermont standard was
understanding and comprehension of the nature of the gift. 57 The court
pointed out that the donor had consistently stated that he wanted his

44. Goodman v. Atwood, 940 N.E.2d 514, 514 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
45. Id. at 516.
46. Id. at 517.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 518.
49. Id. at 518 n.9.
50. Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue, 782 A.2d 1219, 1219 (Vt. 2001).
51. Id. at 1222.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1223.
54. Id.
55. Goodhue, 782 A.2d at 1223.
56. Id. at 1223-24.
57. Id. at 1224; see also RICHARD A. LoRD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10.8 (4th
ed. 2012).
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property to be preserved as farmland. 58 The court implied that, if the
donor's sister got control of the land, it would soon be sold to a
developer, thus defeating the donor's intent. 59 Additionally, at the time
of the execution of the gift deed, the donor did not show any signs of
mental deterioration.6 ° When setting up the trust, he had ensured that he
might continue living on the farm. 61 The court thus denied the plaintiffs
claim that Landmark Trust personnel had subjected the donor to undue
he had had an arm's length relationship with the
influence, noting that 62
trust's representatives.
From the above cases, the test applied by some courts for mental
capacity to make an inter vivos gift is the same as that applied for
testamentary capacity, plus the donor's understanding of his or her
affairs. This test is a lesser standard than contractual capacity,63 which
requires not only that the parties have an understanding of much more
complicated documents but also that parties control 64their behavior in
such a way that they exhibit decision-making capacity.
3.

Contractual Capacity

In determining an individual's capacity to execute a contract, courts
generally assess the party's ability to understand the nature and effect of
the act and the business being transacted.65 Accordingly, if the act or
business being contracted is highly complicated, a higher level of
understanding may be needed to comprehend its nature and effect, in
contrast to a very simple contractual arrangement.66 While courts
normally hold that a bargained for exchange provides adequate
consideration, in a situation where a party has contracted in a way that
obviously is a very poor bargain, the court may refuse to uphold the
contract.67

58. Goodhue, 782 A.2d at 1226-27.
59. Id. at 1229.
60. Id. at 1226.
61. Id. at 1222.
62. Id. at 1229.
63. See LORD, supra note 57, § 10.8.
64. Id. The need for the client to "understand" the documents is hard to enforce
where the documents are complex and tax driven. Indeed, many lawyers cannot
understand these documents. However, by signing a document, a client is held to have
understood it.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67.

See id.
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Capacity to Convey Real Property

To execute a deed, a grantor typically must be able to understand
the nature and effect of the act at the time he or she makes the
conveyance.68 If the transfer is part 69of a contractual agreement, the
grantor must have contractual capacity.

An individual wishing to appoint a holder of a durable power of
attorney or execute a living will must have the mental capacity required
to execute a contract.7 ° Under the common law, contracts made by
parties lacking mental capacity are either void or voidable. In many
states, such contracts are void by statute.7' In general, the level of
capacity required to execute a contract is higher 72 than that required to
make a gift73 or to establish a trust. 74 The common law test for
contractual capacity has been stated to be "cognitive," meaning the
individual must understand the scope and effect of the transaction.75
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has added another criterion
for contractual capacity: Parties to a contract must not only understand
what they are doing, they must also have the ability to "act reasonably in
relation to the transaction., 76 This requirement is especially relevant in
cases where it appears that one party was aware of the other's mental
capacity and used it to make an unfair bargain.
A 2001 Tennessee case, Rawlings v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company,77 reiterated that individuals granting a durable

power of attorney should have contractual capacity.7 8 In Rawlings, a
woman suffering from dementia was placed in a nursing home.79 When
her husband informed her that he wanted a divorce, she granted her
brother a power of attorney.80 She substituted her brother for her
husband as the beneficiary of her life insurance. 8' After her death, her
husband sued when he discovered he was not the beneficiary of the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
See id.
Frolik & Radford, supra note 13, at 313.
See id.
at 317.
See id. at 304.
Seeid. at312.
See id. at 311.

75.

See LORD, supra note 57, § 10.8.

76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (1981)).
77. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001).

78. See id.
at 296-97.
79. Id. at 294.
80. Id. at 295.
81.

Id.
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insurance policy. 82 He alleged that his wife had been incapacitated when

she granted a power of attorney, thereby voiding her power to change
beneficiaries.83 The appeals court applied the Second Restatement test:
the grantor must not only know what she is doing, but also must be able
to "act in a reasonable manner., 84 After reviewing the evidence, the
court decided that the plaintiff had not proved that his wife was too
incompetent to execute a contract at the time she had granted the power
of attorney to her brother. 85
5.

Mental Capacity and Health Care Proxies

State statutes govern health care proxies. Hence, standards for
mental capacity will vary by jurisdiction. In general, courts presume
patients to be competent to make decisions about their health care. 86 The
American Bar Association has developed a cognitive test to determine if
the patient is capable of informed decision-making: considerations
include the patient's awareness of medical needs, the patient's ability to
express preferences, and the patient's understanding of the "risks,
benefits, and alternatives." 87 Those who wish to contest a health care
appointment on mental capacity grounds must prove that, at the time the
proxy was executed, the patient was incapable of decision-making.88
Unless a health care proxy is appointed before the patient becomes
incapacitated, her choice of agent may be challenged. Where there is a
challenge, the burden of proof may then be shifted to the agent to prove
that the patient had been competent at the time of appointment.
In a 2002 New York case, In re Rose S.,89 a patient appointed 91a
health care proxy. 9 ° One day later, Rose was diagnosed with dementia.
Her agent claimed that he had suggested a health care proxy because her
doctors indicated that Rose was no longer capable of informed decisionmaking.92 He had read the proxy to her, but he could not be sure that she
truly comprehended the document she signed. 93 The court held that the

82.

Rawlings, 78 S.W.3d at 295.

83. Id.

84. Id. at 297 (quoting
85.
86.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

15(1)(b) (1981)).

Id. at 299.
See Frolik & Radford, supra note 13, at 315.

87. MICHAEL L.M. JORDAN, DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY AND HEALTH CARE
DIRECTIVES § 3.7 (4th ed. 2011).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See In re Rose S., 741 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
In re Rose S., 741 N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
Id. at 86.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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fact that Rose had not made a choice of agent until after she was
incapacitated deprived her of the power to make that choice.94
The lack of "informed consent" is often an issue in medical
malpractice claims. 95 Informed consent requires that one's consent to
treatment be competent, voluntary, and informed.96 Capacity is only one
element of the test of informed consent. 97 A person may have capacity to
make a treatment decision, but the treatment decision will lack informed
consent if it was either involuntary or unknowingly made. 98
While clinicians may be employed to evaluate a patient's mental
capacity to execute a health care power or another instrument or action,
lawyers need to be knowledgeable about capacity as well. 99 In particular,
the counseling-drafting lawyer, who will ultimately be responsible for
deciding whether she will draft instruments for the client, must be aware
of the legal standard for mental capacity to be applied. It would not be
atypical to find that the legal standard will be far different from the
standards applied by psychologists, psychiatrists, and other medical
personnel.' 00 A lawyer may need to determine the legal tests for a
client's capacity to execute an advance directive for health care if there is
litigation, or to establish in court a client's incapacity to make a
particular health care decision.10 ' The test of capacity to execute a health
10 2
care directive is generally parallel to that of capacity to contract.
However, because the capacity to contract varies with the complexity of
the contract
terms, 10 3 a finding of capacity may depend on other
04
factors.

6.

Mental Capacity to Execute a Trust

The Restatement (Third) of Trusts requires that settlors of
irrevocable trusts have contractual capacity.' ° Settlors of revocable
trusts, however, need only testamentary capacity. 106 The Second
Restatement, by contrast, requires that all settlors have contractual

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See In re Rose, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 86.

See JORDAN, supra note 87, § 3.6.
Id.
See id. § 3.7.
In re Rose, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
See AM. BAR ASS'N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 12, at 13.
Id. at 33.
See JORDAN, supra note 87, § 3.7.
See LoRD, supranote 57, § 10.8.
See id.
See id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 (2003).
Id.
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capacity. 10 7 The higher standard for irrevocable trusts is said to be
justified by the potential effects upon an incapacitated settlor during his
lifetime. 08 By contrast, revocable trusts are typically used as a form of
will substitute, hence the requirement for testamentary capacity only.
The general rule is that those who could not legally dispose of property
by deed cannot dispose of it by trust.10 9
A Massachusetts case, Farnum v. Silvano,110 illustrates the courts'
view on the mentally incapacitated and their right to dispose of property
either by deed or by trust. An elderly woman, Viola Farnum, sold her
Cape Cod home for half its value to the man who mowed her lawn."1 1
This woman's capacities had been deteriorating for some time, to the
l2
point where she believed that the police were trying to arrest her cat."
Her guardian contested the sale, and Silvano defended by claiming that
Ms. Farnum was experiencing a "lucid interval" when the deed was
executed. 113 The court felt that this moment of lucidity was certainly not
enough:" 14
Competence to enter into a contract presupposes something more
than a transient surge of lucidity.
It involves not merely
comprehension of what is 'going on,' but an ability to comprehend
the nature and quality of the transaction, tofether with an
understanding of its significance and consequences.
Thus, the court extended contractual capacity to include an
understanding of the "reasonableness and consequences of the
transaction." Ms. Famum clearly did not possess this capacity and, as
such, the court ordered rescission.
In the treatise Scott and Ascher on Trusts, the authors note that
6
capacity tests for revocable and irrevocable trusts are distinguishable."
In addition, they indicate that more than one test is appropriate for
determining whether a settlor had the mental capacity to create a trust. 117
A settlor creating a testamentary trust would need the mental capacity
required to make a will." 8 A settlor creating an inter vivos trust would
107.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 22 (1959).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. § 18-22.
See Frolik & Radford, supra note 13, at 313.
Famum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
Id. at 203.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 205.
Famum, 540 N.E.2d at 204 (citations omitted).

116.

MARK L. ASCHER & MARGIT T. RIGNEY, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 3.2

(5th ed. 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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need the capacity for "an outright transfer of the property during lifetime,
as by gift or otherwise."' "19 Revocable trusts, in their opinion, are "often
nothing other than will-substitutes," 20 and therefore, the test for capacity
should be the settlor's ability to make a will.121 Irrevocable trusts, on the
other hand, represent "a transfer of property
by gift," and a higher level
122
required.
be
should
capacity
mental
of
Ironically, Scott refused to deal with the mental capacity issue in the
1935 Restatement (First) of Trusts. "The extent of the capacity of
married women, infants, insane persons, aliens, and other persons of
limited capacity, to transfer property is not within the scope of the
23
[original Restatement of Trusts]."'1
Depending upon the nature, complexity, and consequences of the
act at issue, lawyers and judges have few road signs in seeking an answer
124
to the question of capacity for many of these transactions.
Accordingly, the clinical models of capacity may be used to help
supplement legal notions with scientifically grounded indicators.' 25
C.

How Much Does the Lawyer Have to Know About Diminished
Capacity?

What are legal standards of diminished capacity? 26 It is said that
lawyers need to be familiar with standards of capacity under controlling
statutes, case law, and ethical guidelines for assessing capacity, as set
forth in the ABA's Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct (MRPC). Rule
1.14 provides:
(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of
minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.
(b) When a lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
capacity, is at the risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm
unless action is taken, and the client cannot adequately act in the
client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
119.
120.

Id.
Id.

121.

ASCHER & RIGNEY, supra note 104, § 3.2.

122.
123.
124.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 18(b) (1935).
See Frolik & Radford, supra note 13, at 313.

125. See Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in the
Elderly: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 71, 71-96

(2004).
126.

See supra notes 10-11.
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protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities
that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in
appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
conservator, or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with
diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective
action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized
under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to
the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests. 127
In non-adversarial situations, such as estate planning or the handling
of specific transactions, issues of capacity are confronted more
informally in daily practice. In such a setting, legal practitioners by
necessity make implicit determinations of clients' capacity on at least
two points. First, the lawyer must determine whether a prospective client
has sufficient legal capacity to enter into a contract for the lawyer's
services. 128 Otherwise, representation cannot proceed.
Second, the lawyer must evaluate the client's legal capacity to carry
out the specific legal transactions desired as part of the representation
(e.g., making a will, buying real estate, executing a trust, making a gift,
etc.). Fortunately, for the typical adult client, the presence of adequate
capacity is obvious. 29 Moreover, as a legal and ethical matter, courts
presume capacity.1 30 It is only in cases where there are signs of
questionable capacity that a capacity determination becomes a conscious
either deliberately undertaken, or haphazardly
mental process-one
13
muddled through. 1
III. LEANING TOWARDS A UNITARY STANDARD
While some courts may continue to recognize the varying standards
for mental capacity (even when all of the documents constituting the
package are prepared at the same time), these courts only pay lip service
to the differences in capacity tests. There appears to be a tendency now

127.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011).

128. Usually, the lawyer will present to the client an engagement letter. This can be
drawn in a very simple way. Whereas trusts and estates lawyers see themselves as
representing only the client, elder lawyers may include other family members as well.
129. One need not ask legal questions in order to judge capacity. A simple
conversation about daily activities may suffice. For instance, does the client keep his
own checking account, pay his own bills, deal with everyday problems, and keep up
relations with long-term family and friends?
130. See Gilmer v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16, 20 (Va. 1947) (guardians named in the
morning and will was executed in the afternoon).
131. See In re Estate of Raney, 799 P.2d 986, 996-97 (Kan. 1990) (overturning jury
verdict of insane delusion).
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to apply one standard across the board, particularly where all lifetime and
estate planning is carried out at the same time.'32
For example, in Ware v. Ware,' 33 John and Margaret Ware placed
their homestead in a revocable living trust known as the "Ware Family
Trust., 134 After John's death, Margaret became owner of the family
homestead. 135 In 2000, when Margaret was 83 years old, she transferred
the property into "another revocable living trust entitled the Margaret
Ware Revocable Living Trust,"' 136 naming her four children as the
beneficiaries. 137 In 2003, Margaret, as trustee of the Trust, gifted the
entire homestead to one child; 138 and the child, upon receiving title
to the
139
property, "quit-claimed his mother a life estate in the property.'
The child's sister sued her brother who had received the property. 4 0
The sister argued that the brother had exerted undue influence over their
mother. 141The brother moved for summary judgment, claiming his sister
alleged no facts to support her claim of undue influence. 142 The court
granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no issue regarding
Margaret's competence. 143 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alaska,
summary judgment was upheld.'"4 In evaluating the claim of lack of
mental capacity, the court stated:
Additionally, we have held that a testamentary gift may be void if the
grantor lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and
extent of the gift he or she is making. We see no reason not toapply
this reasoning to an inter vivos gift such as the one in this case.
IV. A UNITARY APPROACH TO
AND ESTATE PLANNING

CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT LIFETIME

Should there be a unitary test for lifetime and estate planning? If
there is to be one unitary standard for finding mental capacity in
connection with the preparation at the same time of the documents

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188 (Alaska 2007).
Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188 (Alaska 2007).
Id. at 119l.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ware, 161 P.3dat 1191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ware, 161 P.3dat 1191-92.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1193.

2013]

CAPACITY FOR LIFETIME AND ESTATE PLANNING

1077

constituting the package, what should that standard be? Consider the
following suggestion:
A. For purposes of finding mental capacity to carry out acts of
lifetime and estate planning, an individual at the time of
executing the documents that make up "the package"' 146 must

have an understanding:
(1) Of the acts to be carried out, whether it be the act of:
(a) transferring assets,
(b) gifting,
(c) execution of a durable power of attorney,
(d) creating a health care power,
(e) creating a revocable or irrevocable trust, or
(f)creating a will;
(2) Of the property to be dealt with;
(3) Of the natural objects of bounty; and
(4) How the acts to be done will affect the client and
whether the intent of the client will be carried out.
B. To the extent that an individual fails to understand any of the
above, with regard to the act to be carried out, the carrying
out of the acts involved shall be invalid.
C. The above Unified Approach shall also be applied to lifetime
and estate planning carried out at different times, unless the
circumstances that exist at that time of executing a document
are different.
This uniform approach is preferable to current standards because it
is easier to apply in practice. It sets the highest capacity standard as the
unitary standard for the entire group of documents. This approach thus
minimizes the risks and consequences of equating higher capacity
standards with lower standards.
V.

CONCLUSION

Law is built upon past precedents. 147 However, when these
precedents are no longer meaningful, practitioners tend to disregard
them, and new standards are created. For lifetime and estate planning,
the question to consider is whether there are any real advantages to
146. As discussed previously, the package includes the following: a will, a trust
(revocable or irrevocable), a health care power, a durable power of attorney, and a living
will.
147. See Charles P. Sabatino, Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions, in OLDER
ADULTS' DECISION-MAKING AND THE LAW (Michael Smyser, K. Warner Schaie &
Marshall B. Kapp eds., 1996).
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holding on to the present system of varying degrees of mental capacity as
opposed to moving to one unitary system. Realistically, practitioners
tend to overlook and equate the varying standards for capacity. A
change in the capacity rules that mirrors what is actually being done in
practice should help to allow for judgments that are more consistent.
Perhaps it is time to consider adopting a new unitary standard for mental
capacity.
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APPENDIX: DEMENTIA AND ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE

The lawyer may be called upon to make a judgment on mental
capacity. Often, the thought is that the client is suffering from dementia.
A wide range of diseases affecting the brain can cause dementia.
Alzheimer's disease is the most common cause. 148 Sixty to seventy
percent of dementia cases are related to Alzheimer's. 149 New drug
therapies are emerging to slow 15the
progress of Alzheimer's, but it
0
remains incurable and irreversible.
How can a lawyer without medical training identify Alzheimer's?
Everyone experiences occasional episodes of forgetfulness, especially as
they grow older. Alzheimer's, however, goes much further than typical
absentmindedness.
But how can one distinguish between simple "senior moments" and
dementia? It is probably normal if you forget small things, like where
you put your car keys or the name of someone in your outer social circle.
Researchers think this forgetfulness may be a result of changes in the
brain that begin around age 50, such as a gradual loss of receptors on
brain cells and a decline in certain neurotransmitters. 15 ' However, when
someone begins forgetting pertinent information or their memory is
disrupting their daily activities and life, it is probably time to seek advice
from a medical professional.
Besides memory loss, people with
Alzheimer's may exhibit symptoms
like a decrease in ability to
152
concentrate or navigational skills.
Mild cognitive impairment falls in between normal memory
function and dementia. People with mild cognitive impairment are able
to carry on daily activities without difficulty, but at least one cognitive
skill is below normal or in decline. They are at increased risk of
developing dementia. Below are some common warning signs of each of
these three stages: 53

Typical age-related changes:
*

*

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Experiencing some memory loss, but can be independent in
daily activities and describe instances where you forgot
something
Making a bad decision once in a while

AM. BAR ASS'N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 12, at 67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 68
AM. BAR Ass'N & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 12, at 68-69.
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Missing an occasional monthly payment
Forgetting which day it is and remembering later
Sometimes forgetting which word to use
Losing things from time to time
May have to pause a moment to remember the way, but
doesn't get lost in familiar territory
You are more concerned about your forgetfulness than your
close family members and friends are

Mild Cognitive Impairment:
*
"
*
*

One cognitive skill-usually memory-is below normal or
in decline
In some cases, subtle problems in cognitive skills like
language, attention, spatial skills, and problem solving
Confirmation of impairment on neuropsychological tests
Difficulty with learning and delayed recall of information
compared with others of the same age and education level

Warning Signs of Alzheimer's Disease:
*
*
*
*
*
*
•
*
*
*
*
*

•

Memory changes that disrupt daily life
Challenges in planning or solving problems
Difficulty completing familiar tasks at home, at work, or at
leisure
Confusion with time or place
Trouble understanding visual images and spatial
relationships
New problems with words in speaking or writing
Misplacing things and losing the ability to retrace steps
Decreased or poor judgment
Withdrawal from work or social activities
Changes in mood and personality
Person gets lost in familiar places
Person complains of memory problems only if specifically
asked; cannot recall instances where memory loss was
noticeable
Dependence on others for key daily living activities

